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DIVERSITIES
OPERATION OF THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES.-The Rule
against Perpetuities permits limitations which postpone the vesting
of a gift to the expiration of a period measured by lives in being
at the time the gift takes effect, i. e., in case of a will at the death
of the testator. The lives determining the period not only need not
be lives of beneficiaries, but they also need not be lives of per-
sons specifically enumerated or named. This liberality is only
qualified by the requirement that the expiration of the lives must be
provable. The language of Lord Eldon in Thellusson v. Wood-
ford' is: "During any number of lives, not exceeding that, to which
testimony can be applied, to determine, when the survivor of them
drops." Sir A. MacDonald, Chief Baron, in the same case said :2
"any number of lives, the exhaustion of which could be proved
without difficulty."
The qualification impairs the definiteness of the rule. Even
though it be said that it is not a question of whether the Rule
against Perpetuities has or has not been infringed, but whether
the gift is void for uncertainty,3 it remains true that there are
few criteria more uncertain in their application than that of cer-
tainty or uncertainty.
In the case Re Villar4 the "period of restriction" set by testator's
will was the period ending at the expiration of twenty years from
the day of the death of the last survivor of all the lineal descend-
ants of her late Majesty, Queen Victoria, who should be living
at the testator's death. Testator died in 1926.
Mr. Butler, former editor of "Burke on Peerage," testified
that in 1922 there were one hundred descendants of Queen Vic-
toria living, and that it might be very difficult and very probably
impossible (another version makes him say: extremely difficult, if
not impossible) in the future to prove who was the last survivor of
the lineal descendants of Queen Victoria living September 6, 1926.
Astbury, J., in the Chancery Division of the High Court up-
held the will, although with reluctance; he thought that, apply-
ing Thelusson v. Woodford, the limitation would be void if it were
substantially impracticable to ascertain the extinction of the lives,
but not void if ordinary testimony were available, although difficult
and expensive.
The decision is sustained by the Court of Appeal. Lord Han-
worth, M. R., says: "The difficulties are not insurmountable and
they may arise, but one cannot say they must arise." "I join with
Lord Eldon and Astbury, J. in regretting that a will may be validly
1. (1805) 11 Ves. 112, 146.
2. Supra, note 1, at 134.
3. Laurence, J., in 140 L. T. 92.
4. [1929] 1 Ch. 243 [1928] Ch. 471 for report of decision in court below.
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made in terms which give rise to great difficulty at the present
time, and probably still more so in the future, without any com-
pensating advantage to anyone except to give latitude to the vanity
and mere caprice of the testator."
Astbury, J. said the testator had used an old form of prece-
dent. This special form of limitation was first brought to the
notice of the writer of this note, when the English papers pub-
lished the will of Herbert Spencer, in which it is found the great
philosopher was not above this particular vanity. It may be sur-
mised that the decision in the Villar case is due to the unwillingness
of the court to throw doubt on the validity of many wills, and
that the expressions used were intended to serve as warnings that
the limitation may be declared at some time invalid; for it barely
satisfies the test of Thellusson v. Woodford, if indeed it is within
the language of that case.
The right of the testator to select, as measuring the period of
restriction, lives that have no connection with the provisions of his
will, is peculiar to the common law, and is perhaps in part to be
accounted for by the fact that the Rule against Perpetuities is not,
as it is in other legal systems, confined to testamentary or family
arrangements. It is said that the policy of the Rule is not serioasly
affected since in any event "all the candles burn at the same time."
A note to the Villar case in [1928] Ch. 471 shows that in the
well known case of Cadell v. Palmer,5 where the vesting was post-
poned to the expiration of twenty years after the extinction of the
lives of twenty-eight' persons who were beneficiaries under the
will, the testator died in April, 1818, and the estate was wound up
on May 16, 1918, a few months after the expiration of the period,
which turned out to be almost exactly one hundred years. The
period of restriction in the Villar case can hardly be expected to
produce a more prolonged tying up. Still the favorable chances
can undoubtedly be increased by the contrivance sanctioned in
England. Probably the Villar case will put an end to the particular
form of limitation which it upheld.
ERNsT FREUND.
THE ORIGIN OF THE SPEA ER's GAvEL.-The gavel of the
speaker of the legislative assembly may be taken as the physical
symbol of Legislation. But how did the gavel originate? This
seems to be so far something of an historical mystery. In the
hope of evoking further contributions to clearing up this mystery,
three beginnings are here offered; the first from the pen of Profes-
sor Robert W. Millar, who prepared a note for the Descriptive
Booklet of the Law School Buildings of Northwestern Univer-
sity; the second from Professor J. Nelson Frierson, Dean of the
Law School of the University of South Carolina, who, upon read-
ing the first named note, sent the pages of the Legislative Manual
of the State of South Carolina, in regard to the parliamentary mace;
5. (1833) 1 Cl. & F. 372.
